The 1976 Swine Flu is a cautionary tale and one that is eerily informative on several issues surrounding COVID-19 (C19). It is important to know exactly how the government concluded that they should intervene with a nationally mandated vaccine program. It was an outbreak that could have been handled more delicately with less intrusive policy decisions and with less cost to the American public in both treasure and health side effects.
The second order effects of the 1976 swine flu program may have been the start of the 1977 H1N1 pandemic. It has been widely reported that Chinese and Soviet laboratories may have thawed out a stored c1950 version of the 1918 Spanish Flu virus in response to the U.S. 1976 swine flu program. Poor handling procedures resulted in an accidental release of the virus in the Soviet Union and China. (Furmanski, 2014) (Zimmer & Burke, 2009)
Following the infection of soldiers at Ft. Dix, New Jersey with what appeared to be a novel Swine Flu, and a subsequent mid-January 1976 meeting which included Ft. Dix medical professionals and the state epidemiologist, there were four issues of concern to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Human-to-human swine flu transmission that had been unseen since 1920, except for a few reported cases in the close proximity to pig vectors, appeared possible and likely.
Following World War I, this strain of virus had confined itself to pigs, and researchers surmised that if it had returned to infect a human population; none younger than 50 would have built up antibodies.
The Fort Dix virus had undergone an antigenic shift[1] where both of its expressed surface proteins (antigens) differed significantly from previous lineages of the virus negating any resistance carried over from exposure to the current virus.
The 1918 pandemic, the most virulent influenza known to modern medicine, killed upwards of 21 million.
No one in the CDC could accurately define the virulence factor, and no one had any reason to suppose it was as virulent as the 1918 epidemic. In the defense of scientists at the CDC and other research facilities at that time, it was widely thought that any antigenic shift was quickly followed by pandemic. This supposition has since been tempered, but scientists assessed that an antigenic shift had occurred every decade or so with additional nucleotide changes occurring every second or third year at pace. There had been shifts in 1957 and 1968 followed by the Asian Flu and Hong Kong flu, and public health officials were expecting another by about 1978.
The media was also complicit in the cascade of poor decisions that followed. The New York Times published an article by Harold Schmeck on 20 February 1976 raising the possibility of a Spanish Flu level epidemic. (Schmeck, 1976) It was subsequently included on ABC and CBS newscasts, with NBC showing inflammatory images from the 1918 epidemic. As the federal program to deal with this potential epidemic was being developed, media outlets continued to use scare tactics to sell their product.
The leadership was provincial and myopic; decisions were only viewed through a public health filter that blocked out everything other than government-selected experts who were treated as saviors in a righteous cause. Ironically, the one body of experts well represented in the decision making process – scientists and vaccine experts – got even that small part completely wrong.
On March 10, 1976, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the United States Public Health Service (ACIP) concluded that the early detection of an outbreak caused by the New Jersey Swine Flu strain provided an opportunity to produce a vaccine. They believed the military model of vaccine production could be swiftly accomplished without adverse effects, despite the expedited nature of the endeavor.
They had it wrong, both on the severity of the pandemic and the solution, which resulted in significant deleterious effects to the American public. Summarizing the ACIP consensus, one member stated:
"If we believe in prevention, we have no alternative but to offer and urge the immunization of the population."
Said in other words, we CAN do it, so let’s make it happen regardless of the countless other factors we are not considering.
Decision makers also felt undue urgency due to the idiosyncrasies of how the pharmaceutical industry manufactures vaccines. The roosters (yes, roosters) used in production of the 1976-77 influenza season vaccine were scheduled to be slaughtered. Without these vectors, they would have to wait months to resume production of new vaccines.
On 13 March 1976, an action memo was presented to the Secretary of the Department of Health Education and Welfare (DHEW) proposing 4 alternative courses of action. The language appeared to heavily weight decision making towards a large-scale response regardless of the gaps in knowledge.
Option 1: Assume that there will be no pandemic and let the virus take its natural course;
Option 2: The federal government embarks on a major program to immunize the entire population;
Option 3: Execute a minimal response, in which the federal government would only contract for sufficient vaccine production to protect the traditional federal beneficiaries—military personnel, Native Americans, and Medicare-eligible persons.
Option 4: Execute an exclusively federal response without involvement of the states.
The director of CDC recommended option 2 and contracting with private pharmaceutical companies to produce vaccine sufficient to reach the entire population. As a reason to adopt this plan of action, the memo stated that the Administration assessed excess health expenditures were a small price to pay if a pandemic were to occur.
They didn’t pay the price. The taxpayers did as the pharmaceutical companies and politicians happily skipped down the road of good intentions.
The decision to adopt the second option was a fait accompli before ever making it in front of President Ford. Despite the CDC’s accurate comparison of the 1976 outbreak to the severity of the unmemorable 1968-69 Hong Kong and 1957-58 Asian pandemics, a well-timed letter from the DHEW staff to the executive branch intimating the possibility of a repeat of 1918, led to more aggressive action. The Ford administration convened an advisory board consisting of respected scientists like Albert Sabin and Jonas Salk, and President Ford believing he was facing an epidemic of Spanish Flu proportions, accepted the recommendations and initiated the National Influenza Immunization Program (NIIP).
Immediately after appropriation bill congressional deliberations, the CDC held a meeting with all the directors of state health departments and medical societies. As the states were poised to get sizable sums of federal financial support, with just two exceptions, there was no opposition.
The NIIP implemented the program and had complete authority to draw upon any CDC resources needed. NIIP was responsible for relations with state and local health departments, reported to the Director CDC, and retained control over the federal grant program for state operations. They provided technical advice to the procure, store, and distribute vaccine to state health departments and established NIIP Surveillance Assessment Center (NIIP-SAC) to monitor for adverse effects of the influenza vaccines.
NIIP immunized 45 million in 10 weeks, which resulted in a doubling of the level of immunization for persons deemed to be at high risk, but also causing debilitating effects for a portion of the recently vaccinated but previously healthy population. (Spencer & Millar, 2006)
It is a shame no one revisited this sad tale prior to Operation Warp Speed. It was well-documented. The National Academy of Sciences published a book entitled the “Swine Flu Affair, Decision-making on a Slippery Slope” which can only be described as damning in its criticism.
There were a few obstacles to the program. Before the New Jersey outbreak, in January 1976, the CDC proposed legislation that would have compensated persons damaged as a result of immunizations when licensed by the FDA and when administered in a manner recommended by the ACIP. The CDC rationalized the proposal by making immunization a societal benefit.
If immunization was a societal benefit, then it outweighed the individual’s right to compensation, therefore society (taxpayers) should pay any compensatory damages. The government took away a significant factor in ensuring private companies produced sound product: risk of private liability. (Spencer & Millar, 2006) The federal government’s capitulation spoke volumes as it ensured fast-tracked vaccines couldn’t be trusted.
Well, one might think the debacle would make it difficult to trust fast-tracked vaccines, but here we are…
As vaccine test batches were prepared, there was still a lack of sufficient doses for large scale implementation of the program. While initially shown to be safe during initial field trials, it did not cause an immunological response in children. A second trial with a revised schedule was implemented with potentially better results immunizing the children. (Spencer & Millar, 2006) (Denny, et al., 1976)
The program was funded by congress with a 135-million-dollar appropriation, the equivalent of 626 million USD today. It was further buttressed by special liability legislation before they began inoculations in earnest in the Fall of 1976. Despite difficulties in determining children’s doses and uneven geographic distribution, vaccination proceeded quickly.
State health departments administered the program with the assistance of the DHEW; however, it ended abruptly on 16 December 1976 when the vaccine was subsequently linked to Guillan-Barré Syndrome, a side effect causing paralysis or death. (Neustadt & Fineberg, 1978)
Some government officials tried to characterize the failure of the program as the nature of an increasingly litigious society, and an unfortunate side effect of the government’s desire to allow pharmaceutical industry to focus on producing high quality product; however, the subsequent emergence of Giullain-Barré Syndrome in a statistically significant manner above that which could be expected in the target population, put the nail in the coffin and should serve as a cautionary tale.
It would appear, this tale was not dusted off and retold prior to the great COVID panic of 2020.
The 1976 Swine Flu never materialized in the scope imagined and subsequent government review by the office of the Secretary of DHEW Joseph A. Califano Jr. came to the conclusion that there were seven key failures:
Overconfidence by specialists in theories spun from meager evidence;
Conviction fueled by a conjunction of some preexisting personal agendas;
Zeal by health professionals to make their lay superiors do right;
Premature commitment to deciding more than had to be decided;
Failure to address uncertainties in such a way to prepare for reconsideration;
Insufficient questioning of scientific logic;
Insensitivity to media relations and the long-term credibility of institutions.
These were the failures to which Secretary Califano surprisingly admitted in a National Academy of Sciences publication, but you know what he was sure wasn’t a problem…party politics.
“One thing we are convinced the program was not. Whatever the contemporary notions from the outside, it wasn’t party politics. President Ford wanted to protect the public health.”
That sounds so familiar. A confluence of government bodies and private companies were willing to experiment on the US population. Crony-capitalist relationships fostered by the FDA and DHEW buttressed the pharmaceutical industry’s ability to be shielded from liability. They dressed their disruption to society in the veneer of moral certitude making questioning of motives an attack on righteousness, and although they were wrong, it was a well-intentioned error so no accountability was really necessary.
The only difference I see in our current situation with the experts dripping in virtue signaling and clamoring to dictate lockdown and vaccine mandates on a healthy population, is the fact that a truthful accounting of the 1976 failures made its way to the public – even if it is buried in a National Academy of Sciences publication published decades ago. (Neustadt & Fineberg, 1978)
They took the simplistic view of chalking up numbers of mass vaccinations over a short period of time to be a measure of success. They patted themselves on the back for developing a comprehensive surveillance system and assessed that although the above-mentioned problems were notable, the American’s public’s psyche didn’t suffer.
But don’t worry, they were sure to mention the trauma to the government employees that had to administer the program. They were distraught over that human toll of 532 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome and 32 deaths.
So, I get it. They got it wrong in 1976, but in this case it was worth it. We advanced a new technology and mass-produced “vaccines” in record time. Our scientists were better trained with better tools, and they were serving a higher purpose, right?
Isn’t one life saved worth it?
Shouldn’t we have viewed the “temporary” loss of our freedom, the loss of income, the inability to get treatment for other health issues simply a worthy sacrifice for the greater good?
No.
Bibliography
Denny, F., Glezen, W., Karzon, D., Katz, S., Krugman, s., & McIntosh, K. (1976). Swine-like influenza vaccine: a commentary. Journal of Pediatric Medicine, 88(1087).
Furmanski, M. (2014). Laboratory Escapes and "Self-Fulfilling Prophesy" Epidemics. Center For Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Scientist's Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.
Neustadt, R., & Fineberg, H. (1978). The Swine Flu Affair, Decision-Making on a Slippery Slope. Washington, DC, US: Thhe National Academies Press. Retrieved from The National Academies of Sciences Engineering Medicine: https://doi.org/10.17226/12660
Schmeck, H. (1976, February 20). U.S. Calls Flu Alert On Possible Return Of Epidemic's Virus. The New York Times.
Spencer, D. J., & Millar, J. D. (2006, January 1). Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination Program. Emerging Infectious Disease, 12(1), 29-33.
Zimmer, S. M., & Burke, D. S. (2009, July 16). Historical Perspective - Emergence of Influenza A (H1N1). The New England Journal of Medecine, 361, 279-285.
[1] Antigenic Shift is when viral surface proteins change from earlier lineages making them less recognizable by the host and consequently reducing the host’s ability to mount an immunological response.